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Recognizing the Needs of Adopted Persons:
A Proposal To Amend the Illinois Adoption Act
INTRODUCTION
The practice of adoption, while not recognized under the common
law of England,' is nonetheless an institution ancient in its origins.2
The legends and myths of the Greeks and Romans produced at least
two well known adoptees: Oedipus, the ill-fated King of Thebes,'
and Hercules, the adopted son of Zeus.4 Moses, perhaps the most
forceful personality in the Old Testament, was the adopted son of
Pharaoh's daughter.'
Roman civil law provides the historical basis for modem adoption
laws.' In the United States adoption is strictly a creature of statute.
Illinois enacted its first adoption legislation over a century ago. 7  Nu-
merous legal scholars have analyzed various constitutional aspects of
the Illinois adoption laws.8 A major amendment to the Illinois Adop-
tion Act 9 was occasioned by the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Stanley v. Illinois"° wherein the Court held that an unwed
1. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 603 (1968). The first adoption
statute was not passed in England until the 20th century. The Adoption of Children
Act, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 29 (1926).
2. For an excellent article detailing the history of adoption see Huard, The Law
of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743 (1956).
3. SOPHOCLES, OEDIPUS THE KING (F. Storr transl. 1912).
4. J. FRAZER, THE GOLDEN BOUGH (1890).
5. Exodus 2:5-10.
6. See generally Brosnan, The Law of Adoption, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 332 (1922);
W. BUCKLAND, A TExT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW 121-28 (3d ed. 1963); R. LEAGE, ROMAN
PRIVATE LAW 114-20 (3d ed. 1961).
7. An Act to provide for the Adoption of Minors, Law of February 22, 1867, p.
133, ILLINOIS LAWS.
8. Lutterbeck, The Law in Illinois Pertaining to the Adoption of Children, 8 DE-
PAUL L. REv. 165 (1958); Veverka, Right of Natural Parents to Their Children as
Against Strangers, 61 ILL. B.J. 234 (1973); Note, Child Without a Family: Problems
In Custody and Adoption of Children, ILL. L.F. 633 (1962); Comment, Illinois Inheri-
tance Laws and Adopted Children, 2 DEPAUL L. REV. 63 (1952); Comment, Adopted
Children's Rights, 42 ILL. B.J. 304 (1954).
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-12a (1973).
10. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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father, like other parents, is entitled to a hearing on his fitness before
his children are taken from him."'
However, neither the Illinois General Assembly nor the state's review-
ing courts have directly addressed themselves to the desirability or
validity of current laws which severely restrict an adopted person's
ability to acquire access to information regarding his biological par-
ents, the circumstances of his birth, and his subsequent adoption. De-
spite this legislative and judicial inactivity, the topic of adoptees'
rights has generated substantial popular interest, as reflected in the
media. 2
The purpose of this article is threefold: first, to examine the nature of
the legal relationship between an adopted child and his natural par-
ents; second, to discuss the procedure and overall effect of impound-
ing and sealing adoption records, original birth certificates of adopted
children, and court proceedings regarding adoptions; third, to pro-
pose an alternative to the present Illinois law, whereby adult adoptees
would have access to confidential information regarding their adop-
tion.
THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP
The Rights and Duties of Natural Parents
In order to analyze the ultimate effect that adoption has on all the
parties involved, it is necessary to discuss briefly the purely legal re-
lationships which adoption creates and destroys. In Illinois, the legal
consequences imposed by an adoption are delineated within the adop-
tion statute:
After the entry either of an order terminating parental rights or
the entry of a decree of adoption, the natural parents of a child
sought to be adopted shall be relieved of all parental responsi-
bility for such child and shall be deprived of all legal rights as
respects the child, and the child shall be free from all obligations
of maintenance and obedience as respects such natural parents.' 3
11. For an excellent discussion of the Stanley decision see Note, "Strange Bound-
aries" of Stanley: Providing Notice of Adoption to the Unknown Putative Father, 59
VA. L. REV. 517 (1973).
12. See, e.g., Gorner, Adoptee's Plight, Chicago Tribune, June 24, 1974, § 2, at 1,
col. 1; Gorner, Searching for Natural Parents, Chicago Tribune, July 8, 1974, § 2, at
7, col. 3; Bartlett, Seeking an Answer to "Who Am I," Chicago Tribune, September 10,
1974, at 1, col. 2; Nobile, The Right to Be Illegitimate, Chicago Sun-Times, July 28,
1974 (Magazine) at 15, col. 1; Gorner, Adoptee Finds Her Real Dad, Chicago Tribune,
September 25, 1974, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
13. Illinois Adoption Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-17 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as the Illinois Adoption Act § 9.1-171.
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The viewpoint expressed by the Illinois statute is in accord with the
generally accepted rule, subject to various exceptions, that adoption
terminates all existing rights and duties between the adoptee and his
natural parents. 4 Since adoption is in derogation of the parent-child
relationship, it has been held that courts must strictly construe the
adoption statute.15 The rights of natural parents are not terminated
until all parties have precisely complied with the mandates of the
adoption laws.16
One court has taken the position that once the adoption decree is
entered the adopted child then "becomes no more than a stranger" to
his natural parents. 17  Another court, albeit in dicta, has gone to fur-
ther extremes in characterizing the adopted child-natural parent rela-
tionship:
Custody may be awarded for a temporary duration but a decree
of adoption severs forever every part of the parent and child
relationship; severs the child entirely from its own family tree and
engrafts it upon that of another. For all legal and practical
purposes a child is the same as dead to its parents. The parent
has lost the right to ever see said child again or to have any real
knowledge of its whereabouts.1 8
Although the Illinois statute19 indicates that adoption terminates all
legal rights and duties between the adoptee and the natural parents,
Illinois courts have taken the position that the natural parent remains
ultimately liable for the support of his child even though that child
has been adopted.2" In Dwyer v. Dwyer the Illinois Supreme Court
set forth its view of the natural parents' obligation to an adopted
child:
An adoption of a child does not work a complete severance in the
relationship between the child and its natural parents. The duty
of a parent to support his minor child arises out of the natural rela-
tionship, and while that duty may also be imposed upon the adop-
tive parents by statutory enactment, the natural parent may, if
14. 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons § 139, at 570 et seq. (1972).
15. Dwyer v. Dwyer, 366 I11. 630, 10 N.E.2d 344 (1937).
16. In re Cech, 8 111. App. 3d 642, 291 N.E.2d 21 (1972).
17. People v. Issachar, 203 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1960).
18. In re Adoption of Bryant v. Kurtz, 134 Ind. App. 480, 487, 189 N.E.2d 593,
597 (1963). The comparison of an adoption to the death of the child with respect to
the natural parents is provocative. While the statement that the natural parent has no
right to see the child or know of its whereabouts is surely valid, does it necessarily fol-
low that the child must also consider for all "legal and practical purposes" his natural
parents dead? If that is in fact the conclusion to be reached, it is an unnecessary mock-
ery of the child's very existence. It is as though the state has decided that the child
was never genealogically a part of anyone. It is biologically and historically impossible
to graft one person onto the family tree of another.
19. Illinois Adoption Act § 9.1-17. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
20. Dwyer v. Dwyer, 366 Ill. 630, 10 N.E.2d 344 (1937).
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necessity arises, be required to perform that duty . . . .The stat-
ute is not to be construed as relieving the natural parents from
all obligation to support their minor children.21
The Dwyer opinion has been cited in recent decisions as an accurate
interpretation of the law as it exists in Illinois. 22 It should be noted
that while Dwyer imposes a residual obligation upon the natural par-
ent, neither that case nor subsequent cases have found that any resid-
ual rights vest in the natural parent by reason of that obligation."
Adoption and Inheritance
Another aspect of how the Illinois courts have viewed the legal rela-
tionships between the natural parent and the adopted child is reflected
in cases decided under the Illinois Probate Act.24  In In re Tilliski2'
the court held that under Illinois probate practice a child who is
adopted is not restricted in his right to inherit through intestacy from
his natural parents:
The statute authorizing adoption of children is remedial. It was
unknown to the common law. Primarily, it is beneficial to the
adopted child. It gives to it rights it did not have before. It
does not purport to lessen any of its natural rights, but gives addi-
tional rights. The same right of heirship from blood parents en-
joyed by a natural child should not be taken from an adopted
child unless clearly required by statute. We are of the opinion
that under the statute in force at the time of the death of Mary E.
Tilliski, intestate, her natural child, Sarah A. Martin, was entitled
,to a child's share, and that 'the fact that she had been previously
adopted did not deprive her of it.26
21. Id. at 634, 10 N.E.2d at 346.
22. People ex rel. Bachelda v. Dean, 48 Ill. 2d 16, 268 N.E.2d 11 (1971); Gill v.
Gill, 8 Ill. App. 3d 625, 290 N.E.2d 897, alf'd 56 Ill. 2d 139, 306 N.E.2d 281 (1973)
(involving child support after divorce). But see H. CLARK, LAw OF DOMESTIC RELA-
TIONS § 18.9 at 659 (1968) wherein that author takes the position that the better rule
is that natural parents should retain no obligations towards their children who have been
adopted.
23. See, e.g., People ex rel. Witton v. Harriss, 307 Ill. App. 283, 30 N.E.2d 169(1940), where the court held that a natural mother did not retain the right to visit the
adopted child and thereby dismissed the mother's theory that such visitation should be
allowed since she was ultimately liable for the support of the child.
24. Illinois Probate Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 11, 12, 14 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Illinois Probate Act].
25. In re Tilliski, 390 Ill. 273, 61 N.E.2d 24, aJI'g 323 Ill. App. 490, 56 N.E.2d 481(1945).
26. 390 Ill. at 285, 61 N.E.2d at 29. The Illinois Supreme Court apparently agreed
with the view expressed by the Illinois Appellate Court in in its decision, 323 111. App.
at 504, 56 N.E.2d at 487:
[I]t seems to us that the conclusion is irresistible that an adopted child, in a
legal sense is both the child of its adopting parent and its natural parent. We
reach this result not only because the overwhelming weight of authority in the
United States points in that direction, but to hold otherwise would be extremely
unjust and unnatural. Consanguinity cannot be ignored in placing a meaning
upon our adoption and descent statutes.
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Under the Illinois Probate Act the term "parent" includes both the
mother and father of a legitimate child, but only -the mother of an il-
legitimate child27 unless that child's parents intermarry and he is ac-
knowledged by the father.28  A reasonable extension of the rationale
in Tilliski is that a legitimate adopted child has possible statutory
rights to inherit through intestate succession from both of his natural
parents, while an illegitimate, unacknowledged adopted child can in-
herit only from his mother. Moreover, section 12(8) of the Illinois
Probate Act has been interpreted to allow an adopted child who was
illegitimate at birth to inherit through the laws of intestacy from the
collateral ancestors of his natural mother.29 Other jurisdictions have
taken the position, either by statute or by judicial decision, that an
adopted child can only inherit from its adoptive parents.30 Provi-
sion is also made in the Illinois Probate Act that natural parents and
their kindred may, under certain circumstances, inherit from the
adopted child."' A case involving such an inheritance would most
likely arise only in a very unique fact situation, but such a case is not
beyond the realm of possibility. 2
It is not the purpose of this article to discuss in detail the intricacies
of descent and distribution in Illinois, or the trends of inheritance laws
throughout the country."3 However, -the Illinois Probate Act, when
27. Illinois Probate Act § 12(8) provides in its relevant part that:
An illegitimate child is heir of his mother and of any maternal ancestor, and
of any person from whom his mother might have inherited, if living ...
28. Illinois Probate Act § 12(8) provides in its relevant part that:
[A] child who was illegitimate whose parents intermarry and who is acknowl-
edged by the father as the father's child is legitimate.
29. Warner v. Gregory, 415 F.2d 1345 (7th Cir. 1969); Gregory v. LaSalle County,
91 Ill. App. 2d 290, 234 N.E.2d 66 (1968).
30. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.13 (1972); Mississippi Valley Trust Co.
v. Palms, 360 Mo. 610, 229 S.W.2d 675 (1950) (holding that adoption should not op-
erate as an instrumentality for dual inheritance). The National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws has also taken the position that adoptees should only
inherit from their adoptive parents. Uniform Probate Code § 2-209.
31. Illinois Probate Act § 14 in relevant part provides that:
An adopting parent, and the lineal and collateral kindred of the adopting par-
ent, shall inherit property from a child lawfully adopted to the exclusion of
the natural parent and the lineal and collateral kindred of the natural parent,
in the same manner as though the child lawfully adopted were a natural child
of the adopting parent, except that the natural parent and the lineal or collat-
eral kindred of the natural parent shall take from the child and the child's
kindred the property that the child has taken from or through the natural par-
ent or the lineal or collateral kindred of the natural parent by gift, by will,
or under intestate laws.
32. Conclusion based on an interview with Associate Judge John J. Hogan, Circuit
Court of Cook County, Probate Division, in Chicago, Illinois, September 20, 1974.
33. Two excellent articles dealing with problems involving adopted persons and in-
heritance are, Fleming, Inheritance Rights of Adopted Children, 35 CHI. B. Rnc. 221
(1954) and Note, The Adopted Child's Inheritance From Intestate Natural Parents, 55
IowA L. REv. 739 (1970); H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 18.9 (1968) also
has an excellent brief discussion of inheritance problems created by adoption supple-
mented by numerous case citations.
Loyola University Law Journal
read in conjunction with the Illinois Adoption Act, 4 raises an interest-
ing problem. Illinois probate law presently provides a statutory right
to adopted children to inherit from their natural parents. Illinois
adoption laws, however, serve to restrict an adoptee from learning the
identity of his natural parents. The confidentiality encouraged by
adoption laws makes it virtually impossible for a person who has no
knowledge of his natural parents to claim an interest in property
through intestate succession. The problem could, of course, be re-
solved by an amendment to the Probate Act which would specifically
eliminate an adopted person from the chain of intestate succession of
the adoptee's natural parents. The point is raised here to illustrate an
apparent inconsistency in the policies of two legislative enactments.
The laws of inheritance promote the policy that the estate of an intes-
tate decedent should be distributed on the basis of consanguinity. The
effect of the Illinois adoption statute is to contradict that policy by
promoting total anonymity between the natural parents and their
adopted offspring. Impounding and sealing adoption-related mate-
rial raise serious issues in areas other than inheritance, as discussed
below.
THE EFFECT OF SEALED RECORDS
The Relevant Statutes
Under Illinois law, the court records relating to an adoption pro-
ceeding can be impounded upon the motion of any party to the pro-
ceeding or upon the court's own motion. 5 Thereafter, the custodian
of the court records can produce the materials only upon specific order
of a court of competent jurisdiction. The court limits access to those
persons specified in this order."6 In addition to court records, the
adoptee's original birth certificate may be subject to impoundment.
In most cases, a new certificate of birth is prepared by the State Reg-
istrar of Vital Records upon receipt of a copy of an adoption decree.3 7
34. Illinois Adoption Act § 9.1-18 provides:
The word "illegitimate" or the words "born out of wedlock", or words import-
ing such meaning, shall not be used in any adoption proceeding in n-v respect.
Upon motion of any party to an adoption proceeding the court shall, or upon
the court's own motion the court may, order that the fue relating to such pro-
ceeding shall be impounded by the clerk of the court and shall be opened for
examination only upon specific order of the court, which order shall name the
person or persons who are to be permitted to examine such file. Certified
copies of all papers and documents contained in any file so impounded shall
be made only on like order.
35. Illinois Adoption Act § 9.1-18. The full text is set out in note 34 supra.
36. Id.
37. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 § 73-17 (1973) provides:
(1) For a person born in this State, the State Registrar of Vital Records shall
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This new birth certificate will often reflect the actual place and date
of birth of the child,"' but will show the adoptive parents, rather than
the natural parents, as the child's mother and father. The original
birth certificate, the evidence of adoption, and any copies of the orig-
inal certificate held by custodians at the local level are sealed from
inspection,39 and can be opened only upon an order of a court of
establish a new certificate of birth when he receives any of the following:
(a) A certificate of adoption as provided in Section 16 or a certified copy
of the decree of adoption together with the information necessary to identify
the original certificate of birth and to establish the new certificate of birth;
except that a new certificate of birth shall not be established if so requested
by the court decreeing the adoption, the adoptive parents, or the adopted per-
son.
(b) A certificate of adoption or a certified copy of the decree of adoption
entered in a court of competent jurisdiction of any other state or country de-
claring adopted a child born in the State of Illinois, together with the informa-
tion necessary to identify the original birth certificate and to establish the new
certificate of birth; except that a new certificate of birth shall not be estab-
lished if so requested by the court decreeing the adoption, the adoptive parents,
or the adopted person.
(c) A request that a new certificate be established and such evidences as
required by regulation proving that such person has been legitimatized, or that
a court of competent jurisdiction has determined the paternity of such a person.
(d) An affidavit by a physician that he has performed an operation on a
person, and that by reason of the operation the sex designation on such per-
son's birth record should be changed. The State Registrar of Vital Records
may make any investigation or require any further information he deems neces-
sary.
(2) When a new certificate of birth is established, the actual place and date
of birth shall be shown; provided, in the case of adoption of a person born
in this State by parents who were residents of this State at the time of the birth
of the adopted person, the place of birth may be shown as the place of resi-
dence of the adoptive parents at the time of such person's birth, if specifically
requested by them, and any new certificate of birth established prior to the ef-
fective date of this amendatory Act may be corrected accordingly if so re-
quested by the adoptive parents or the adopted person when of legal age. The
new certificate shall be substituted for the original certificate of birth:
(a) Thereafter, the original certificate and the evidence of adoption, pater-
nity, legitimation, or sex change shall not be subject to inspection or certifica-
tion except upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction or as provided by
regulation.
(b) Upon receipt of notice of annulment of adoption, the original certificate
of birth shall be restored to its place in the files, and the new certificate and
evidence shall not be subject to inspection or certification except upon order
of a court of competent jurisdiction.
(3) If no certificate of birth is on file for the person for whom a new certifi-
cate is to be established under this Section, a delayed record of birth shall be
filed with the State Registrar of Vital Records as provided in Section 14 or
Section 15 of this Act before a new certificate of birth is established, except
that when the date and place of birth and parentage have been established in
the adoption proceedings, a delayed record shall not be required.
(4) When a new certificate of birth is established by the State Registrar of
Vital Records, all copies of the original certificate of biith in the custody of
any custodian of permanent local records in this State shall be transmitted to
the State Registrar of Vital Records as directed, and shall be sealed from in-
spection.
38. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I11Y § 73-17(2) (1973). The full text is set forth in
note 37 supra.
39. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 111Y2 § 73-17(2)(a) (1973). The full text is set forth in
note 37 supra.
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competent jurisdiction. 40  It is assumed by Illinois attorneys that
mere request on the part of an adult adoptee to see court records re-
garding his adoption or to see his original birth certificate would not
be considered a sufficient reason to open such records.4 '
The statutory practice in Illinois regarding the disclosure of adop-
tion records and original birth certificates of adoptees is similar to
that practiced in other jurisdictions. 42  To date, the validity of these
laws has not been challenged in any reviewing court. It would ap-
pear however, that serious constitutional questions are raised by these
statutes.43 It is this author's contention that constitutional questions
40. There are only a few reported cases where a court has been presented with a
question of what facts establish sufficient reason to open sealed adoption records. See,
e.g., In re Wells, 281 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (inspection denied to natural mother
absent a showing of fraud or evidence that the welfare of the child would be served);
In re Glasser, 198 Misc. 889, 100 N.Y.S.2d 723 (1950) (petition to inspect adoption
record denied in an action for alienation of affection and criminal conversation); In re
Minicozzi, 51 Misc. 2d 595, 273 N.Y.S.2d 632 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (claim that information
contained in adoption record was relevant to defense in a paternity suit held not to es-
tablish good cause).
41. Conclusion based on interviews with attorneys engaged in adoption practice in
Cook County Illinois.
42. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.9 (1950); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210 §
5C (Supp. 1972); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 114 (McKinney's Supp. 1974). Contra,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-66 (Supp. 1974). The National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws has taken the position that adoption record information
should be released only upon the consent of the parties involved. The Uniform Adop-
tion Act § 16 (1971) states:
Notwithstanding any other law concerning public hearings and records,
(1) all hearings held in proceedings under this Act shall be held in closed
Court without admittance of any person other than essential officers of the
court, the parties, their witnesses, counsel, persons who have not previously
consented to the adoption but are required to consent, and representatives of
the agencies present to perform their official duties; and
(2) all papers and records pertaining to the adoption whether part of the
permanent record of the court or of a file in the [Department of Welfare] or in
an agency are subject to inspection only upon consent of the Court and all
interested persons; or in exceptional cases, only upon an order of the Court
for good cause shown; and
(3) except as authorized in writing by the adoptive parent, the adopted
child, if [14] or more years of age, or upon order of the court for good cause
shown in exceptional cases, no person is required to disclose the name or iden-
tity of either an adoptive parent or an adopted child.
43. A discussion of the constitutional questions raised by the impounding of adoption
and birth records and the general nonaccessability of such records to the adoptee is
found in Note, The Adoptee's Right to Know His Natural Heritage, 19 N.Y.L.F. 136-
57 (1973). The focus of the constitutional argument centers on the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The authors of the cited Note contend that statu-
tory denial of access to records such as a person's birth certificate based on his status
as an adoptee creates a discrimination founded on a suspect criteria. This is analogous
to situations where an individual is classified on the basis of his race, lineage or alien-
age. It is pointed out that usually one's status as an adoptee was beyond his control,
just as his race, legitimacy, and sex are also predetermined. A stricter standard of re-
view is employed by courts when considering the validity of legislation which is based
on a suspect classification. It becomes the burden of the state to show that the classifi-
cation is justified by a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971).
The basic interest the state has in adoptions is in promoting the welfare of the
adoptee. The contention is that solid evidence exists to show that adoptees are actually
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raised by the Illinois statutes can be avoided by amending the present
Illinois Adoption Act. An amendment could provide an adoptee, upon
reaching his majority, the opportunity to acquire specific information
regarding his biological parents and his adoption, without making
adoption records available to the public in general.
Evidence In Support of Change
Extensive commentary concerning laws which allow the sealing of
adoption records has been generated by various groups, composed
mostly of adults who were adopted as children."' These organiza-
tions have vocalized the opinion that all adult adoptees have a right
to know the identity of their natural parents:
Yesterday's Children propose that it is a universal need to know
harmed by sealed record statutes. Therefore, such statutes fail to meet the overall pur-
pose of adoption, and thus do not exhibit the compelling state interest necessary to sus-
tain their validity.
Alternative constitutional arguments are also raised. The first is that the right to
know one's natural heritage may be included in the penumbra of rights emanating from
the Bill of Rights. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The points of
analogy include the right to association and the right to acquire useful knowledge, both
of which have been recognized by the Supreme Court, although neither is specifically
set forth in the Constitution. See, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923). Another argument is advanced, relying
mostly on Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold, that an individual's right
to know his natural heritage may be included under the ninth amendment.
Weighing against the adoptee's purported right to know his biological origins are the
rights of the natural and adoptive parents. The right to privacy, best enunciated in Gris-
wold, was later expanded in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) to include, subject to
some limitations, the right of a woman to decide to have an abortion. Granting that
the state has an interest in promoting the anonymity and privacy in adoptions when it
is desired by the parties, the question then becomes whether the interests of the state,
the natural parents, and the adoptive parents supersede any interest the adoptee has in
compromising, to some degree, that anonymity and privacy. It also can be argued that
the adoptee's interest should prevail since children should not be made to suffer for the
transgressions of their parents. See, Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S.
164, 175 (1972). The problem arises in characterizing the surrendering of a child for
adoption as a transgression or an act for which the natural parents should forever bear
the legal burdens.
One final factor discussed by the authors of the cited Note concerns the relationship
between statutes which preserve anonymity in adoption procedures and the possibility
of increased numbers of black market adoptions if such confidentiality were compro-
mised. It is basically a matter of speculation as to whether such adoptions would in-
crease if adoptees, upon reaching their majority, could learn at least their biological
name. Black market adoptions may be on the increase anyway in light of the decreased
number of adoptable children. This shortage is traceable to, among other factors, the
ready availability of legal abortions and the tendency on the part of more and more un-
married mothers to keep their children. Since no conclusive evidence exists that black
market operations would increase if sealed record statutes were amended to allow adopt-
ees access to them, the argument would still be viable that the state has failed to estab-
lish the compelling interest sought to be promoted by such statutes.
44. Only one adoptee's group, Yesterday's Children, Inc., organized by Donna Cul-
loin in Evanston, Illinois, in March of 1974 is presently active in Illinois. Membership
now totals approximately 400. The largest and perhaps best known adoptee's organiza-
tion is the Adoptee's Liberty Movement Association (ALMA), organized by Florence
Fischer in New York City in 1971. Information based on an interview with Donna Cul-
lom, in Evanston, Illinois, September 5, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Cullom Interview].
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your own true identity and the identities of your forbearers. We
propose that because it is a human need it should be recognized
that it is a human right to meet that need. We believe that cur-
rent social practices and current state laws that prohibit adults
from learning their own identities and histories are a violation of
human rights and a violation of civil rights under our Constitu-
tion. We believe that every adult should have access to the re-
corded information concerning his own history and his separation
from his own natural family. 45
While the constitutionality of such laws is debatable,46 sociological
and psychological evidence exists which indicates that the extremely
confidential nature of adoption practice has harmful effects on the
adopted person.47 A strong case can be made that adoption as an
institution would be markedly improved if adult adoptees have access
to their own adoption records. Thus, regardless of whether the right
to know one's biological background is so fundamental as to be pro-
tected by the Constitution, an amendment to the present adoption
statutes merits serious consideration. To date there has been no gen-
eral legislative movement in the United States to alter adoption pro-
cedures insofar as disclosure of information to adoptees is concerned,
but in Great Britain there has been at least one notable advance in
that direction.4 s
45. Id.
46. See discussion in note 43 supra. The constitutionality of the Illinois Adoption
Act § 9.1-18 (full text set forth in note 34 supra) may be subject to attack on the
grounds that the section is unconstitutionally vague. The statute leaves it to the discre-
tion of the court as to whether a sealed adoption proceeding record shall be opened and
made available to named persons. The statute fails to give any guidelines as to how
this discretion is to be exercised. Furthermore, the statute gives no indication of what
parties must have notice of a proceeding initiated to open such a record.
47. Some experts advocate that adoptees should have available to them or to their
adoptive parents substantial information concerning their natural parents. See generally
J. TRISELIOTIS, IN SEARCH OF ORIGINS-THE EXPERIENCES OF ADOPTED PEOPLE (1973);
A. MCWHINNIE, ADOPTED CHILDREN-How THEY GROW UP (1967); M. KORNITZER,
ADOPTION AND FAMILY LIFE (1968).
48. J. TRISELIOTIS, IN SEARCH OF ORIGINS-THE EXPERIENCES OF ADOPTED PEOPLE
166 (1973) [hereinafter cited as TRISELIOTISI:
The final report of the Departmental Committee on the Adoption of Children
(Command Paper 5107) published in October 1972, made certain recommen-
dations that give expression to the findings of this study. The report recom-
mends that the adoption agency or, where there is no agency, the local author-
ity, should be named on the adoption order, so that an adopted person may
himself later be in a position to approach the agency for information that the
adopters are unable or unwilling to provide. Furthermore, adoption agencies
should be required to retain their records for seventy-five years. The commit-
tee also recommended that an adopted person aged eighteen years or over
should be entitled to a copy of his original birth certificate. This recommen-
dation would cover all adopted adults in England, Wales and Scotland.
In fact, Scotland has provided for the availability of birth certificates to adopted persons
over the age of seventeen for the last forty-five years. Adoption of Children Act
(1930), 20 & 21 Geo. 5, ch. 37, § 11 (Scotland) reads:
The Registrar-General shall, in addition to the Adopted Children Register and
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The argument is made that adoptees face a more difficult task of
social and psychological adjustment, and that such difficulties are
often directly related to the adopted person's lack of feeling a continu-
ity with the past.49 Put simply, an adoptee, no matter how strong his
emotional ties with his adoptive parents and family may be, is in
many instances deprived of certain self-identity reinforcements that are
derived from the knowledge that one has blood relatives. In some
cases the adoptee may not know of his nationality, his race, or the exis-
tence of biological siblings. In addition, the adoptee may be unaware of
such simple facts as who he resembles, where he was bom, or a variety
of other information that non-adopted individuals take for granted.
It is true that the modem practice, at least in adoptions carried out
through public or private agencies, is to provide the adoptive par-
ents with some information concerning the family background of the
natural child. 50  This information is usually imparted orally rather
than in permanent written form. The legitimate or illegitimate char-
acter of the child's birth is also usually known by the adopting party.
Adoption creates a unique legal relationship. "Adoption, unlike mere
custody, severs conclusively the rights and interest of natural par-
ents."'" While adoption is often mistakenly considered as a legally
created substitute for natural childbirth,52 it is actually a legal proce-
dure which results in the creation of a relationship comparable to that
created in marriage. 53  By compliance with the procedures and for-
malities set forth in the Illinois Adoption Act, and the issuance of the
adoption decree, two parties are joined into a legally recognized and
the index thereof, keep such other registers and books, and make such entries
therein as may be necessary, to record and make traceable the connection be-
tween any entry in the register of births which has been marked "Adopted"
pursuant to this Act and any corresponding entry in the Adopted Children Reg-
ister, but such additional registers and books shall not be nor shall any index
thereof be open to public inspection or search, nor, except under an order of
the Court of Session or a sheriff, shall the Registrar-General furnish any infor-
mation contained in or any copy or extract from any such registers or books
to any person other than an adopted child who has attained the age of seven-
teen years and to whom such information, copy or extract relates.
49. TRISELIOTIS, at 160.
50. SCHAPIRO, A STUDY OF ADOPTION PLACTCES (1956); Interview with June
Teason, Director of Adoptions, Illinois Children's Home and Aid Society, in Chicago,
Illinois, September 6, 1974. The problems discussed in this article are most crucial in
instances where the individual was adopted in infancy or at such a tender age as to
have no recollection of his natural parents. Children adopted at an older age or adopted
by relatives usually do not have the same difficulties in gathering information about their
natural parents.
51. In re Cech, 8 I11. App. 3d 642, 645, 291 N.E.2d 21, 24 (1972).
52. For an excellent series of articles regarding the many facets of adoption see
SCHAPIRO, A STUDY OF ADOPTION PRACTICE---SELECTED SCIENTIFIC PAPERS PRESENTED
AT THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ADOPTION, JANUARY 1955.
53. Id.
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socially accepted union." Adoption, like marriage, creates new
rights and obligations and destroys or alters rights and duties of the
parties that existed prior to the adoption. A new legal entity is cre-
ated. Adoption succeeds in severing most of the legal ties between
parents and their natural child, just as divorce destroys most of the
legal consequences of marriage. However, an adoption decree is.
incapable of totally severing those emotional and psychological
ties55 or of destroying curiosity. These feelings may be instinctive or
grow as one comes to realize that being adopted is in some way dif-
ferent than being the natural offspring of one's parents.5" "There
is ample evidence that the adopted child retains the need for seeking
his ancestory for a long time."57
The legal destruction of the adopted person's biological name ef-
fectively puts him in the position of being historically and ancestorally
alone.5" Granting that in most cases the emotional ties between the
adoptee and the adoptive parents will fulfill the overall parent-child
relationship, the adoptee is still quite literally a person without a
past. 59 At one time a person's surname was reflective of his position
54. In the usual case the adopting party consists of a husband and wife. Adoptions
by single persons, not related to the adoptee, are less common, but by no means unheard
of. Conclusion based on information available in a pamphlet distributed by the Adop-
tion Information Service, State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services,
1439 S. Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.
55. Brown, Ingredients of a Therapeutic Family in the Browndale Model, INVOLVE-
MENT 3, 4 (March-April 1974):
No man-made law or court order can change the affiliation of birth. We may
go through a legal procedure to declare a family unfit but, nevertheless, that
family is still the family of the child.
56. Orr v. State, 70 Ind. App. 242, 254, 123 N.E. 470, 474 (1919):
The relation of parent and child is not created by the law of the State. It is
a natural relation, and in all civilized countires it is regarded as sacred. (Cita-
tions omitted).
57. Committee on Adoptions, American Academy of Pediatrics, Identity Develop-
ment in Adopted Children, 47 PEDIATRICS 948, 949 (1971).
58. Cominos, Minimizing the Risks of Adoption Through Knowledge, 16 SOCIAL
WORK 78, 78-79 (1971):
By not sharing differences between the child's and adoptive parents' back-
grounds with the adoptive parents, the adoptive process becomes less painful
and more comfortable for the adoptive parents ....
But what can this practice do to the child? In effect, it erases his natural back-
ground, strips him of his heritage, deprives him of his "genetic" ego. It makes
him a product of nothing-a non person-at least at the time of placement.
It offers no help to the child when he begins to express a normal curiosity
about his natural parents and strives to resolve his problems of identity. The
many unknown facts create conflict, confusion, and distorted fantasies.
59. TwsELioTs, at 166:
The self-perception of all of us is partly based on what our parents and an-
cestors have been, going back many generations. Adoptees, too, wish to base
themselves not only on their adoptive parents, but also on what their original
parents and forbears have been, going back many generations. It is this
writer's view, based on his findings, that no person should be cut off from his
origins.
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in life, his occupation, his kinship or his geographical birthplace. 60
Everyone has experienced the embarrassment and mild anger of be-
ing called by the wrong name. The involuntary changing of a per-
son's name is indicative of his subservience, as evidenced by the prac-
tice of slave owners and traders in the history of our own country.6 1
The undesirable effect of using numbers rather than names to identify
persons in a computerized society has been the topic of much discus-
sion,62 and is a common experience for most citizens of the United
States. An individual's name, and all that it encompasses, is perhaps
more personal and more intimate than anything else he possesses. To
destroy a person's historical identity, which in fact his name reflects,
is to tamper with an important individual psychological and sociologi-
cal foundation. 63
There are instances where the need to obtain the identity of an adop-
tee's natural parents is mandated by a medical problem or some other
special circumstance.64 It must be conceded, however, that most in-
quiries made by adoptees regarding their biological origins begin as
normal childhood inquisitiveness. Since the general practice is for
adoptive parents to inform their children, beginning at an early age,
that they are adopted, and to cultivate the meaning of that rela-
tionship as the child progresses toward maturity,65 it is reasonable to
expect that at some time the adoptee will realize that somewhere in
60. C. BARDSLEY, ENGLISH SURNAMES: THEIR SOURCES AND SIGNIFICATIONS (1889,
reprt. 1968); E. LATHAM, A DICTIONARY OF NAMES, NICKNAMES AND SURNAMES OF PER-
SONS, PLACES, AND THINGS (1904, reprt. 1966).
61. A. HALEY, ROOTS (1974) (an account of one Black American's search for his
ancestoral African tribe).
62. See generally THE COMPUTER AND INVASION OF PRIVACY, Hearings before the
House of Representatives' Committee on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(U.S. Gov't. Printing Office 1966).
63. TRISELIOTIS, at 160:
The study [of adoptees] identified three main areas which have important im-
plications for adoption practice: the developing child's need for warm, caring,
and secure family life; the adoptee's vulnerability to experiences of loss, rejec-
tion or abandonment; and the adopted person's need to know as much as possi-
ble about the circumstances of their genealogical background in order to inte-
grate these facts into their developing personality.
64. E.g., the adoptee or his adoptive parents learn that he has some type of inherited
disease. Consultation with or information from the natural parents is necessary. If this
were :the only problem faced by adopted people in light of sealed records the situation
could be easily remedied. First, it seems reasonable that such a situation might establish
a good cause for having the records opened. Second, the adoption agency or other party
appointed by the court could serve as the intermediary between the parties, obtaining
the needed information without revealing the identity of either.
65. See, e.g., Krugman, Differences in the Revelation of Children and Parents to
Adoption, 46 CHILD WELFARE 267-71 (1967); Sorosky, The Controversy Over the Sealed
Record in Adoption: A Psychological Investigation, a paper prepared for a meeting of
the American Academy of Child Psychiatry in October, 1973; C. PRENTICE, AN
ADOPTED CHILD LOOKS AT ADOPTION (1940). One author does take the position that
adopted children should not be told they are adopted. J. ANSFIELD, THE ADOPTED
CHILD 35 (1971).
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the world there probably exists a person or persons who, biologically
at least, are very important to him. Such a realization on the part
of the adoptee does not necessarily mean that the desire to learn
about his biological and historical past will alter his relationship with
his adoptive parents, or manifest itself in any particular type of con-
duct. 6  There is no doubt that a spectrum of reactions exists. Some
adoptees have an apparent disinterest in acquiring knowledge of their
ancestors or meeting with their natural parents, while others manifest
a compulsion for obtaining such information. 67
The Philosophy Behind Sealed Record Statutes
It is a basic tenet of family law that in cases where the custody of
children is involved, the paramount issue to be considered by the state
and the courts is the welfare of the child.68 The Illinois Adoption
Act specifically incorporates this concept:
The best interests and welfare of the person to be adopted shall
be of paramount consideration in the construction of this Act.69
66. TRISELIOTIs, at 166:
The adoptees' quest for their origins was not a vindictive venture, but an at-
tempt to understand themselves and their situation better.
67. Testimony in support of this proposition appears in the record of a recent New
York case, In re Ann Carol S. (Sur. Ct., Bronx County, dec. August 8, 1974). Peti-
tioner in that case was an adult adoptee who was seeking access to records regarding
her adoption. Petitioner called Dr. Robert J. Lifton, a recognized expert in the area
of adolescent psychiatry and a close associate of Erik Erikson, as a rebuttal witness.
Mrs. Gertrude Mainzer of New York City represented the petitioner in the action. The
following exchange between Mrs. Mainzer and Dr. Lifton is found in the record at 554
et seq.:
Mrs. Mainzer: In your opinion, what happens to an adult who wants this
knowledge but doesn't get this knowledge about his or her
historical origin or historical connectedness?
Dr. Lifton: From my own experience with adopted people and from the
literature, it apparently seems as though every single adopted
person has some significant degree of curiosity about this.
Some are blocked from further effort by that layer of guilt,
others make the effort.
The desire to find out is probably universal. Where it is
blocked, one remains locked in more extreme fantasies. The
fantasies that adopted children seem to have are at either
extreme: Most characteristically, for instance, the mother is
either imagined to be a prostitute in the gutter of society-
otherwise, why would they keep this dirty little secret-or,
at the other extreme, a great queen that will lift one out of
one's ordinary existence into something noble.
Neither extreme of fantasy is healthy or real. So, I think
that one is locked into conflict and there is enormous
frustration in not being able to find one's identity.
I would sum this up by saying a gap in one's sense of
identity will always remain if one cannot find out this in-
formation about one's heritage.
68. Thorpe v. Thorpe, 48 Ill. App. 2d 455, 198 N.E2d 743 (1962); See generally
H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS 572 et seq. (1968).
69. Illinois Adoption Act § 9.1-20a (1973).
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A reasonable argument can be made that those sections of the Illinois
statutes which allow the impounding and sealing of adoption records
and birth certificates imply that the legislature has decided that it is
in the best interest of the child that a high and almost impenetrable wall
of confidentiality and protection surround adoption proceedings.
Illinois courts have not yet had occasion to comment on the ratio-
nale of sealed record statutes. However, cases have arisen in other
jurisdictions which discussed the reasoning behind sealed record stat-
utes. In People v. Doe, a New York trial judge made the following
observation regarding the New York Domestic Relations Law, section
114, which provides for the sealing of adoption records:
[The statute] has assured the mother, who has given birth to a
child born out of wedlock and finds that she cannot properly
take care of the child, that instead of secreting the child or placing
it with persons haphazardly, if she wishes to permit suitable, desir-
ous and qualified persons to adopt the infant, her indiscretion will
not be divulged. It further assures her that the interests of the
child will be protected in that no one will ever know by means of
the adoption proceeding that the child is illegitimate. It assures
the foster parents that they may treat the child as their own in all
respects and need not fear that the adoption records will be a
means of hurting the child, which has become by this proceeding
their child, or of harming themselves. It assures all persons con-
nected with the adoption that the records will be and remain
sealed and secret.70
There are several valid reasons why the General Assembly and the
courts should, during the time following the finalization of the adop-
tion, establish extreme precautionary measures to protect the adop-
tive family and the child. They deserve every help possible to pro-
tect them from the pryings of the natural family 7' and to remove
the social, emotional and legal difficulties that the adoption
may have created.72 What is lost in this logic, however, is the very
basic fact that adopted children do not remain children forever. 73  A
70. People v. Doe, 138 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309 (1955).
71. McGaffin v. Family and Children's Service of Albany Inc., 6 Misc. 2d 776, 164
N.Y.S.2d 444, appeal dismissed, 174 N.Y.S.2d 972, alf'd, 7 App. Div. 2d 769, 179 N.Y.S.
2d 948 (1957).
72. Hubbard v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. App. 2d 741, 747, 11 Cal. Rptr. 700, 704
(1961):
A mother, having given birth to an illegitimate child, must lay bare the details
of her misfortune, perhaps in her statements involving others who may be inno-
cent, but will in any event be convicted without trial if cloture is broken; fam-
ily secrets of petitioners for adoption must often be told to the investigators
which, if ever revealed to the public, could embarrass and punish them through
public censure. There is no need to elaborate.
73. See generally J. PATON, THE ADOPTED BREAK SILENCE (1954) (recounting the
experiences of forty adults who had been adopted children).
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time does come when adopted children, like all children, assume the
responsibilities of adulthood. Thus, while originally it may have been
in the very best interest of the child involved in an adoption to have
the records of that proceeding and his original birth certificate sealed,14
it does not necessarily follow that such action remains in the best in-
terest of that person for his entire life.
It is a reasonable proposition that it would be undesirable to sub-
ject adoption records and court proceedings to general public scru-
tiny. An adoption is very much a private affair, best administered
with a minimum of public fanfare. There is a valid interest on the
part of the state and the parties involved to remove the entire proceed-
ing from the gaze of the over-curious general public, and the stat-
utes here under discussion adequately provide a means to satisfy that
interest. Adoptions of infants carried out through public or private
agencies are usually successfully completed without the adoptive par-
ents and the natural parents ever having come into contact with each
other. The better policy appears to be that these parties remain anon-
ymous. 75  Sealed record statutes promote this policy in an attempt to
avoid the serious conflicts that could arise between the natural and
adoptive parents. The problem becomes particularly acute when
the natural parents have misgivings about having surrendered the child
either before or after the final decree has been entered.76 A statu-
tory provision which would allow an adoptee to have access to his
adoption records upon reaching his majority would continue to pre-
serve the desired anonymity between the natural parents and the
adoptive parents for a substantial period of time. There is no ques-
tion that this anonymity would be compromised by releasing adop-
tion information to the adoptee. However, the undesirable prospects
of a child being caught in the middle of an emotional tug of war be-
74. One reason behind sealed record statutes is to shield from the child the fact that
his birth was illegitimate. This is clearly indicated in the Illinois statute which speci-
fically provides that language pertaining to illegitimacy is not to be used in or appear
on the records of the proceeding. Illinois Adoption Act § 9.1-18. Some researchers
contend, however, that if an adoptee, not otherwise informed, assumes anything about
himself, he assumes that he is illegitimate. Interview, Margaret Lawrence, Director,
Adoption Research Project, at Lake Forest, Illinois, September 13, 1974 [hereinafter
cited as Lawrence Interview].
75. See, e.g., People ex rel. Swasing v. Rebecca Talbot Perkins Adoption Society, 163
Misc. 719, 720, 296 N.Y.S. 778, 780, aff'd 251 App. Div. 868, 298 N.Y.S. 500 (1937):
Good people who are willing to take a homeless child into their homes by way
of adoption should be encouraged in their charity, and they deserve every pro-
tection which the court is capable of giving them in their exclusive custody of
the child and a particular effort should be expended to keep away from the
home the child's parents and relatives ...
76. See generally Katz, The Adoption of Baby Lenore: Problems of Consent and
the Ro!e of Lawyers, 5 FAM. L.Q. 405 (1971).
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tween two sets of parents or the harassment of one set of parents by
the other are for the most part mooted by the adult status of the adopt-
ee."1 As a result, a confrontation between the natural and adoptive
families is unlikely, and even if it did occur would create far less seri-
ous problems than had it taken place during the adoptee's minority.
Proposals which condition the adult adoptee's right of access to his
records upon the permission of his adoptive or natural parents are un-
acceptable:
If the adopted child, when adult, is prevented from fulfilling his
own need to gain knowledge of his natural family because other
adults have the power to withhold their permission, then the adop-
tee is not a free person. The process of relinquishment and adop-
tion have made the child a chattle property to be conveyed first to
the agency and then to adopting parents, not just in childhood,
but all his life.7 8
The Adoptive Parents
It is not difficult to empathize with the adoptive parents who are
faced with the situation of their adopted child manifesting an interest in
his genealogical background. They may react, and understandably
so, with some hostility toward the whole idea. To them the relation-
ship between their child and his natural parents is no more than one
of biological accident. It is the adopted parents who have provided
the adoptee with the parental love, guidance and familial associations
which sociologically constitute parenthood. 9 Adoptive parents may
77. Removing adoption records and original birth certificates from the absolute se-
curity now surrounding them so as to be available to the adoptee may create an oppor-
tunity for abuse, especially along the lines of blackmail. There is no method to deter-
mine if such incidents have taken place. See Note, The Adoptee's Right to Know His
Natural Heritage, 19 N.Y.L.F. 136, 150, nn. 73-75 (1973) where it is stated that offi-
cials in two states which allow adult adoptees access to their records report no particular
difficulties in the administration of their laws.
78. Lawrence Interview. The reference in the quoted material to "chattel" is a
theme that runs through much of the philosophy of some adoptee organizations. The
idea that the homeless child is a commodity to be processed and sold on the adoption
market raises interesting and sensitive questions involving, among other things, the thir-
teenth amendment. Discussion of this aspect of the issue is beyond the scope of this
article. For an excellent treatment of the practice and problems created by some methods
of private adoptions see Note, Moppets on the Market: The Problem of Unregulated
Adoptions, 59 YALE L.J. 715 (1950).
79. Adoptee's groups such as Yesterday's Children take the position that, for the
most part, the fears of adoptive parents regarding their child finding his natural parent
are unfounded. The adoptee is not looking for a parent-child relationship since the
adoptive parents have fulfilled that function. What he is looking for is information
which is usually available only from those people responsible for his birth. Persons who
have succeeded in searching out a natural parent are generally not interested in re-estab-
lishing familial ties, although the relationship may become cordial. Deeper relation-
ships do sometimes form between the adoptee and new found siblings or other relatives.
Cullom Interview.
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respond to such inquiries from their child by refusing to impart to
him any knowledge they possess concerning his natural parents, 0 or by
fabricating unfounded stories about the natural parents in order to
impress upon the adoptee his good fortune in being adopted. Such re-
actions create severe problems in and of themselves. 8"
Adoptive parents, who are not adoptees themselves, have a difficult
time in relating to the needs of their adopted children. "They have
not had the experience of profound orphanhood and are unable to
empathize with their child who wishes no more than to gain for him-
self what other people take for granted-an identity that is real and
rooted in the history of man." 2  Many adoptive parents who do have
some information regarding their child's biological family are no
doubt highly successful in dealing with their child's inquiries about his
natural mother or father. Yet it seems of equal certainty that serious
conflicts can develop within the adoptee and between the adoptee and
his adoptive parents as the child's desire for information becomes more
urgent but remains unsatisfied.'
In fact, the practice of sealing adoption records may contribute
to the problems faced by adoptive parents. The term "sealed rec-
ord" imparts the notion that the confidential information regarding the
adoption is contained only in the court records. This notion is not
necessarily accurate. Organizations such as ALMA, Yesterday's Chil-
dren and Orphan Voyages4 report frequent incidences where adoptees
have succeeded in finding their natural parent(s), even though the
search was carried out without the aid of adoption records, original
birth certificates, private investigators, or any assistance from public
80. Lawrence Interview:
Once you have told a child that he is adopted you have told him who he is
not. You must then gradually begin to tell him who he is.
81. A. McWHINNIE, ADOPTED CHILDREN-HOW THEY GROW UP 262 (1967).
82. Lawrence Interview.
83. The distress felt by adoptees was more than adequately captured by the Greek
dramatist Sophocles in OEDIPUS THE KING (F. Storr transl. 1912) at 101, where in re-
sponse to Jocasta's plea that Oedipus abandon his search for his heritage the King
stated:
Let the storm burst, my fixed resolve still holds
To learn my lineage, be it ne'er so low.
It may be she with all a woman's pride
Thinks scorn of my base parentage. But I
Who rank myself as Fortune's favourite child,
The giver of good gifts, shall not be shamed.
She is my mother and the changing moons
My brethren, and with them I wax and wane.
Thus sprung why should I fear to trace my birth?
Nothing can make me other than I am.
84. An adoptee's group directed and organized by Jean Paton, headquartered in Ce-
daredge, Colorado.
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or private adoption agencies.8 5 While sealed record statutes do serve
to wrap the task in a myriad of red tape which can become exceed-
ingly expensive to unwind, the persistent adoptee who possesses some
solid clue as to his identity, has a good chance of locating a natural
parent.88
THE PROPOSAL
Amending the Illinois Adoption Act to allow adoptive parents general
access to records regarding their child,8 7 and granting the adoptee ac-
cess to those records and his original birth certificate upon reaching
his majority would not only put an end to the elaborate methods now
being employed by adoptees to obtain this information, but would also
improve the entire adoption process. By such an amendment the
adoptive parents would have access to data necessary to answer many
of the inevitable inquiries from their child. The statute would give
notice to both the natural parents and the adoptive parents that
the child will eventually have an option to examine the material for
himself. The adoptive parents will have the benefit of supplying the
child with information in accordance with a schedule by which they
will judge his ability to assimilate the information. Adopting parents
would enter the adoption with the knowledge that in addition to all the
responsibilities of parenthood they have agreed to accept, they may
also participate in the very important task of informing their child
of his historical and ancestral background, even though it may be
foreign to their own.
Adoptive parents who enter adoption with the knowledge that the
child would have the opportunity, in the future, to view the records of
the proceeding and other pertinent information, would be less likely
to overreact when confronted by their child's queries about his natural
85. E.g., Yesterday's Children was formed in March, 1974. By July of 1974 approx-
imately 90 members were attempting to find a natural realtive. By October 1, 1974,
18 members had succeeded in locating a natural parent or other relative.
86. Obviously, the best clue is the real name of one of the parents, but an accurate
date and place of birth, the name of the attending physician, the name of the agency
that handled the adoption, the name of any attorney involved in the procedure, or knowl-
edge of the actual date the adoption decree was entered might all serve as viable starting
points for a successful search. Cullom Interview.
87. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 27, § 4 (Supp. 1973) provides adoptive parents with such
access to the adoptee's original birth certificate. In its relevant part the statute reads:
Upon receipt of copy of any final order of adoption the state registrar of vital
statistics shall cause to be made a new record of the birth in the new name,
and with the name or names of the adopting parent or parents as contained
in the final decree. He shall then cause to be sealed and filed the original
certificate of birth with the decree of the court and such sealed package shall
be opened only upon the demand of said child when he has attained his major-
ity or adopting parents or by the order of a court of record.
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parents. The parent-child relationship between the adoptee and his
adoptive parents could only be strengthened by such a procedure.
Reliance on current statutes to guarantee the anonymity of adoption
serves no purpose when in fact these statutes seem to be frequently
subverted. 88
Permitting access to adoption records on the criteria set out below
would not destroy the overall confidential nature of adoption. The
natural parents and the adoptive parents would continue to remain
anonymous to each other.89 No substantial increased burden would
be placed upon the custodians of the records. Persons other than
the adoptee or the adoptive parents could still gain access to the rec-
ords only upon a showing of good cause in a court proceeding.
Adoptee organizations and others who advocate abolishment of the
stricter sealed record laws do not offer as an alternative exposure of
every person who was ever involved in the difficult decision to give
a child up for adoption.90 The process under the proposed statute
by which an adoptee could learn important personal information
could conceivably evolve over a period of eighteen years. The pro-
posal would not unduly jeopardize other relationships which have
come into existence since the time of the adoption.9
The author does not advocate that the legislature should provide
adopted persons with a statutory right to confront their natural par-
ents, but only that the statute give them the right to acquire information
about those parents from pertinent public records. Ideally, the infor-
mation should be gathered in one central depository, preferably in the
files of the clerk of the court in the county in which the adoption
took place. The best system to disseminate information to the adopt-
ee could be effectuated by an amendment to the Illinois Adoption Act.
The proposal would provide that upon entry of an adoption decree
88. See A. McWmNNm, ADOPTED CImiLDREN-How THEY GRow Up 263 (1967)
wherein that author concludes that the best results are achieved when the adopted child
learns about his adoption from his adoptive parents.
89. It would not seem that there is any great advantage in having adoptive parents
know who the natural parents are by name, although at least one authority has advo-
cated the position that adoptive parents and the natural mother should meet, if only
briefly. Lewis, The Psychiatric Aspects of Adoption, MODERN PERSPECTIVES IN
CHILD PsYcIATRY 428 (ed. J. Howells 1971). The statute could be drawn so as to al-
low access to the adoptive parents to all relevant information, save the actual names of
either the natural mother or father.
90. Cullom Interview.
91. Adoption agencies have an understandable and rightful concern that an adoptee
may unexpectedly confront a natural parent. Interview with June Teason, Director of
Adoptions, Illinois Children's Home and Aid Society, in Chicago, Illinois, September 6,
1974. The possibility of such an occurrence appears more likely under the present law
than under a system where the adoptee would have other sources of information about
his background.
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the court would order a set of documents germane to that adoption be
prepared, sealed and made available to an adult adoptee upon his
request. Included among these documents should be a copy of the
adoption decree and original birth certificate, the true biological name
of the person adopted, background information concerning the nat-
ural parents, the name of the agency, if any, which handled the adop-
tion, information regarding any foster care the child had prior to
adoption and vital medical information about the natural parents. A
provision should also be made for other information about the child's
background to be included at the court's discretion or as requested
by either set of parents. Such a statute would assure the adoptee of
an independent and readily available source of information concern-
ing his ancestry. The author believes that in many cases the avail-
ability of this information would satisfy the needs of most adopted
persons. 92  Such records would adequately have served their purpose
if maintained for a period of seventy-five years.93
CONCLUSION
The social value of adoption cannot be overstated. It serves as a
viable alternative to natural parents who, for one reason or another,
are unable to care for the needs of a child. Private and public adop-
tion agencies provide the medium through which a closely super-
vised and orderly custody transfer can occur. Moreover, agencies
have at their disposal specialists in a variety of fields to service the
needs of the natural parents, the adoptive parents, and the child.
Adoption offers to persons who would not otherwise have children
the opportunity to fulfil their parental desires. Adoption is a practi-
cal solution to problems the state encounters when it is forced to re-
92. Conclusion based on Lawrence Interview and the overall study by TRISELIOTIS,
IN SEARCH OF ORIGINS-THE EXPERIENCES OF ADOPTED PEOPLE (1973).
93. In 1935, the New York State Department of Social Welfare issued a HANDBOOX
FOR THE COLLECTION OF STATISTICAL INFORMATION ABOUT CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE.
The following statement regarding the social purposes to be achieved by the maintenance
of records is made at page 11:
Among these (purposes) is the keeping of a set of archives of children removed
from their own homes who in later life may wish to learn about their families.
Since there is no absolute assurance that these persons will know where to be-
gin to unravel the often tangled thread of transactions which attended their
care and support, especially of those adopted in early infancy, or that records
will have been preserved by the hundreds of voluntary agencies, children's
courts, and county and city commissioners of public welfare, several of which
may have had a hand in the care of a single child, one central confidential
depository of information about each child separated from his own people and
coming under the care of one or another of the agencies or institutions is a
real safeguard of his future interests.
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move a child permanently from the custody of parents determined
by the courts to be unfit.94
Most importantly, however, adoption provides the child involved
with a chance to partake of the benefits of family life under condi-
tions hopefully superior to what they would have been if the child
had remained with his natural family. Adoption is a procedure in-
volving three parties-the natural parents, the adoptive parents, and
the child--carefully supervised by the legislature, the courts, public
and private adoption agencies, and society in general. If the law
serves any party to the proceeding inadequately, then all concerned
are served inadequately. But the focus of the law must be on the
adoptee, since it is primarily for his benefit that the institution exists.95
The problems discussed herein with regard to the effect of sealed
record statutes are better left to the legislature for solution rather
than to the courts. Confidentiality and anonymity are important ele-
ments of an adoption proceeding. But their importance should not
be allowed to overshadow substantial evidence which indicates that
strict confidentiality and anonymity may do more harm than good, at
least as far as the adoptee is concerned. An amendment to the illi-
nois Adoption Act providing adopted persons with access to recorded
information concerning their natural families would substantially im-
prove the institution of adoption, without destroying the general pri-
vacy of the procedure.
STEPHEN A. GORMAN
Author's note:
Recently a class action suit was filed in the Federal District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois alleging that the refusal on the part of state officials to allow adopted
persons full access to their adoption records is a violation of the adoptees' constitu-
tionally protected rights. Yesterday's Children, Inc., et al. v. Leahy, et al., Civil No.
75C378 (N.D. Ill., filed Feb. 5, 1975).
94. Illinois Adoption Act § 9.1-1D (1973).
95. In re Tilliski, 390 Ill. 273, 61 N.E.2d 24, aff'g 323 Ill. App. 490, 56 N.E.2d 481
(1945).
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